Discussions of genitalia, reproduction, biosexism, bioessentialism, intersex genital mutilation

For this section, we draw upon evolutionary biologist Joan Roughgarden’s Evolution’s Rainbow, a study of the immense diversity in sex and gender in animals and humans. What is the most common definition of “sex” in this context? Roughgarden explains that, ultimately, it is a differentiation of gametes based on size. We know the small-gamete (which I will call “microgamete”) as the “sperm” and the large-gamete (which I will call “macrogamete”) as the “egg” in animals that undergo some form of sexual reproduction, but even this can vary—Roughgarden presents the example of a Drosophila (fruit fly) species where the microgamete size is as large as the macrogamete size!

But this becomes the basis of conventional sex-differentiation from an evolutionary biologist’s perspective. Beyond this point, however, Roughgarden shows how everything flies out the window. Through an exhaustive coverage of the simplest animals, to our great ape cousins, we learn that there is little in the way of commonality between what kinds of bodies produce microgametes and what kinds of bodies produce macrogametes, or even their roles and behaviour.

Many species have extremely distinct and unique chromosomal systems that are nothing like human systems, some of which are not binary at all. Many species can change whether they produce micro- or macrogametes based on external temperature conditions; or seemingly at a particular point in their life, if certain conditions necessitate it; or apparently at will. Some animals can alternate between sexual and asexual reproduction (an example being parthenogenesis) based on external conditions. Macro-gamete producer mammals such as hyenas can have external genitalia while micro-gamete producer mammals can have internal genitalia, such as whales, and other such micro-gamete producers get the “egg incubation” role instead of the macrogamete producer, such as seahorses. Many animals exhibit some form of biological hermaphroditism, like flatworms, and there are numerous mammals like various mole species who even possess “ovotestis” tissue in commonality, that is, gonadal tissue that can potentially produce both micro- and macrogametes.

Roughgarden explains how the extensive diversity in “sexed bodies” essentially renders this “natural” definition of binary sex moot, and to top it all off, presents an extensive theory that improves upon Darwinian sexual selection in light of this massive sex variation and sex diversity, while also taking into account recent developments in animal behaviour science and social choice.

If this state of fluidity and slipperiness exists in essentially all other animals, what about humans? How is “sex” defined in humans as opposed to how evolutionary biologists define it? When you’re a baby, a doctor looks at your junk and assigns you a “sex” based on this. However, this sort of assignment is where we begin to see the lie for what it is, in how this so-called “assignment” is immensely damaging towards people who are intersex.

Dr. Cary Gabriel Costello’s work and research presents a massive trove of information on intersex people, as both a doctor and an intersex activist. Through his work, and the work of others such as Dr. Anne Fausto-Sterling, we see the existence of the “phalloclitoris,” and how there is immense spectral variation in genital shape due to how all genital structures come from the same tissue. In fact, much of the rich variety in genital shape works fine.

On top of this, Claire Ainsworth’s famous literature review published in Nature, “Sex Redefined,” provides further damning examples against the supposed truth of “binary biological sex.” Individuals may have numerous different chromosomal combinations of X and Y of all genders and all people who produce micro- or macrogametes (or those who do not produce either), not just XX for “women” and XY for “men,” and live perfectly fine lives, not even knowing that they are someone with different chromosomal combinations than they are “supposed” to have. Furthermore, Ainsworth provides cases where different cells from different parts of the same people have exhibited different combinations of these X and Y chromosomes in them, challenging conventional ideas.

Hormone levels vary immensely from person to person, as testosterone, estrogen, progesterone, and so on are both produced by the same body but in different levels, and the exhibition of so-called “secondary characteristics” due to this are immensely affected by the personal makeup of the body, whether particular hormones can even be accepted (e.g. androgen insensitivity syndrome), and other external conditions that allow for heavy variation in supposedly “gendered” characteristics like body hair (which, for example, women are socially expected to shave off!), breast tissue (gynecomastia), and fat distribution. There are even cases where gonadal tissues simultaneously exist in the same body, such as in the existence of the “ovotestis,” and in Ainsworth’s specific example of a man who fathered multiple children, but still was found with a womb inside him on his death bed.

Cordelia Fine’s two books, Delusions of Gender and Testosterone Rex, respectively tackle and effectively discredit the prevailing theory that “men and women have different brains” and “the hormones in men and women cause their behaviours,” not only attacking the “science” involved in the above, but also insinuating how these are constructions of ideology. Other characteristics like height, muscle mass, and even bone structure have such a great deal of variance that they are inadequately precise definitions upon which to base a dimorphism, without simply being blatant about fitting square pegs into round holes.

But where I discussed the insidiousness of ideology through scientism before, this is where it rears its ugly head. Costello and Fausto-Sterling discuss the phenomenon of “intersex genital mutilation,” where individuals with so-called “ambiguous genitalia,” which otherwise has been shown to function perfectly fine, would be medically mutilated into one of two “binary forms” (penis or vagina, often with an additional removal of gonads) which would subsequently lead to scarring, infertility, and a host of other things created by this medical adherence to a “binary” by claiming that these forms are “incorrect and abnormal.” This is despite the fact that something around 1 in 100 people are some form of intersex using the more precise definition, which would amount to approximately 7.4 million people, larger than both the population of Canada and the population of people with red hair. On top of this, individuals are socially expected to adhere to ideas of this “platonic form” of “man” and “woman” which is then retroactively justified to attempt to claim a physical sexual dimorphism despite the fact that a large deal of evidence points to the fact that such a dimorphism does not exist.

So then, all we are left for as a basis of “sex” is the same definition as the evolutionary biologist’s: size-differentiated gametes. But then it makes absolutely no sense to refer to sexed bodies in this way. Firstly, not everybody produces gametes. Secondly, we have seen that the tissues that produce these gametes are not always disjoint for the same body. Thirdly, “male” and “female” descriptors are social descriptors. We refer to male bikers or female scientists and so on. It is therefore bad science to needlessly use “male and female gametes” as these descriptors make as much sense as using “happy and sad gametes” in that they offer no proper information on the gametes, as they should, and they project ideological social constructions for absolutely no reason.

This is why I have used “microgamete” and “macrogamete” above, as these descriptors are far more accurate—they do not gender what does not need to be gendered—and they close the lid on gendered language when referring to biology, keeping it to the only realm it should exist in: society.

When we want to refer to different things like uterine or testicular health, or hormonal health, or chromosomes, or secondary characteristics, or so on, it therefore makes far more sense to actually refer to these on the basis of these individual characteristics and conditions for the patients involved, without needing to arbitrarily use an unwieldy moniker that groups people with immense variations together under one category that contains a massive amount of internal difference while holding up a standard of “normal” that can be damaging in itself. A woman’s body is a woman’s body, a man’s body is a man’s body, a non-binary person’s body is a non-binary person’s body: a body and its components are gendered only on the basis of the person’s gender as a whole, and that’s all there is to it.

And with that, we see “sex” fall away as a meaningful category that “objectively exists in nature,” witnessing it for what it is: as pseudoscientific as my examples of race science were. But then why does it exist? This is where the function of ideology through scientism, as I discussed above, comes into play.